A New Rhetoric: The EU’s Shift Towards a More Coura­geous Atti­tude Facing China

Datum
19. August 2020
Autor*in
Valentin Dreher
Redaktion
politikorange
Themen
#NewsroomEurope 2020 #Politik
flagge eu china_groesser

flagge eu china_groesser

Edited by Lisa Pausch

Germany had an ambi­tious goal for its EU council presi­dency: Putting China on a level playing field with the EU by helping to nego­tiate a new trade agree­ment. COVID-19 might have squashed those ambi­tions. Still, the pandemic has shown Euro­pean leaders that more inde­pen­dence from China is badly needed.

Starting in the early 2000s, China has grown to be an economic power that can no longer be belittled or ignored. Tire­lessly, Chinese inves­tors have gained influence all around the world, backed by a state-run capi­ta­li­stic system. Last year, Chinese enter­prises invested 12 billion Euros in the EU member states alone.

Before the novel Coro­na­virus spread across the globe, China and the Euro­pean Union were in the midst of nego­tia­ting a new invest­ment treaty, the EU-China Compre­hen­sive Agree­ment on Invest­ment. The main objec­tive for the Euro­pean Union in this matter is to reach more recipro­city, an equal economic exch­ange.

William Fingleton, Head of Press & Infor­ma­tion at the Dele­ga­tion of the Euro­pean Union to China, notes, Euro­pean compa­nies opera­ting in China do not benefit from the same level of trans­pa­rency and fair compe­ti­tion as those enjoyed by Chinese compa­nies in the EU market.“ He believes that the new treaty could help level the playing field between Euro­pean and Chinese compa­nies.

While Chinese inves­tors can invest in the EU market without hindrance, Euro­pean inves­tors are strained by a strict set of rules when buying shares in China. One of those limi­ta­tions is that foreign invest­ment into some Chinese indus­tries is capped at 51%, whereas Chinese inves­tors can own up to 100% of Euro­pean compa­nies. In some sectors, foreign invest­ment also needs to occur in coope­ra­tion with a Chinese company.

The German plan

Those crucial nego­tia­tions continue while Germany holds the EU council presi­dency until the end of the year. In this role, the Federal Repu­blic sets the agenda for the EU Council and acts as a mediator between the 27 count­ries of the Euro­pean Union. One of the main goals will be to rede­fine the role of the Euro­pean Union towards China. The policy on China adopted by all EU insti­tu­tions and Member States should be united and balanced, and shaped by long-term common EU inte­rests and values“, the programme for the German council presi­dency states.

Joshua Rosen­zweig, Amnesty Inter­na­tio­nal’s Deputy Regional Director in Hong Kong, believes that Germany’s council presi­dency might have a large impact on EU-China rela­tions in the future. China sees Germany as the stron­gest power within the EU. What Germany says and does holds a lot of weight. Germany can use that leverage to push the EU further towards a more forceful response to China“, he says. He also believes that China has lost much of its sympathy from German economic players: The German busi­ness commu­nity has realised that China’s under­mi­ning of the inter­na­tional rules-based system does not work in the inte­rest of German busi­ness.“ He argues that this shifted percep­tion allows German poli­tical leaders to take a more critical stance towards China with regards to human rights.

Origi­nally, Chan­cellor Merkel had planned to hold a flag­ship summit with the Chinese and the EU’s heads of states. The pandemic inter­fered with this plan: Both the summit and visits to China by the Presi­dent of the Euro­pean Commis­sion, Ursula von der Leyen, and the Chan­cellor had to be cancelled. We are trying to support the commis­sion the best we can in this nego­tia­tion. We would really like to conclude the trade agree­ment with China during our presi­dency – but not at all costs“, says Dr. Susanne Hegels from the German Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy. There was a video confe­rence between von der Leyen and the Chinese govern­ment on the 22nd of June, where each side’s posi­tions on the treaty were clari­fied.“

A new rhetoric

Her remarks reflect a new rhetoric towards China. Multiple EU offi­cials have recently called the Peop­le’s Repu­blic a nego­tia­ting partner but also an economic compe­titor and a systemic rival. Experts see this clear choice of words as a para­digm shift in the EU’s approach towards China.

This also applies to the EU’s condem­na­tion of human rights abuses in China, argues Joshua Rosen­zweig, who is a long term observer of foreign rela­tions with China. Parti­cu­larly since 2019, the EU has assumed a much more robust posi­tion with respect to China and took a stand on human rights issues. The EU has incre­asingly engaged in voicing oppo­si­tion to human rights issues like the erosion of civil rights in Hong Kong and the pres­sure put on human rights acti­vists and lawyers in main­land China.“

Previously, the EU has tried to make China a more respon­sible country by inte­gra­ting it into the global trade frame­work, writes Mark Leonard, Director of the Euro­pean Council on Foreign Affairs. He believes this plan has failed: Under Presi­dent Xi Jinping, the Chinese state has increased its role in the economy, and Chinese markets have become less hospi­table to Euro­pean compa­nies.“ He says the EU has now back­tra­cked from its ambi­tions to inten­sify economic rela­tions with China, aiming to coope­rate more with other count­ries‘ compa­nies.

Amnesty Inter­na­tio­nal’s Rosen­zweig believes that the EU’s stra­tegy towards China must contain three parts in the future. They need to be able to call out China loudly and firmly, and they need to build coali­tions beyond Europe to hold China accoun­table. But they also need to reaf­firm and demons­trate the importance of human rights and the rule of law at home“, he explained, poin­ting out that it is easy for China to chall­enge critical voices like the EU if their own record on human rights is not untainted.

Euro­pe’s depen­dence on China

Mean­while, the coro­na­virus pandemic has pain­fully shown the EU member states how much they rely on Chinese produc­tion. The health equip­ment sector was mostly outsourced to China and India. As a conse­quence, many Euro­pean count­ries were forced to wait for face masks and personal protec­tive equip­ment from China when the pandemic hit. Compared to the begin­ning of this year, China could (as the only one of the largest trade part­ners) increase its exports to the EU during the pandemic. In April 2020 alone, the member states purchased 129 million Euros more in articles from textile fabrics (inclu­ding face masks) than in April 2019, accor­ding to Euro­stat.

This has prompted the German Minister for Econo­mics, Peter Altmaier, to encou­rage EU member states to diver­sify their supply chains and restart dome­stic produc­tion of health­care equip­ment. His subor­di­nate, Dr. Hegels, elabo­rates, of course it is not very good to be depen­dent on one country which produces masks, for instance. The crisis has rein­forced the need to diver­sify and keep open markets.“

Beijing has often weapo­nised mask and PPE deli­veries for geopo­li­tical gain, and at the begin­ning of the crisis, it exploited Euro­peans‘ scramble for medical goods“. For instance, in the EU’s back­yard, China might have been able to increase its influence due to COVID-19. Serbia, a candi­date country for acces­sion to the EU, has praised the Chinese for their medical assis­tance during the pandemic. The Chinese aid insti­gated the Serbian Presi­dent Alek­sandar Vučić to lash out against the EU: Euro­pean soli­da­rity does not exist. That was a fairy tale on paper.“ Only China was able to help, he continued.

A divided Union

Not even all of the EU’s current member states might fully agree with the Germans‘ new critical stance on China. To ensure the future viabi­lity of the poli­cies of its presi­dency, Germany will work toge­ther with the subse­quent presi­ding count­ries Slovenia and Portugal in a Trio Presi­dency, formu­la­ting a joint agenda.

Both Slovenia and Portugal have in the past expe­ri­enced signi­fi­cant Chinese invest­ments in their compa­nies. Portugal saw incre­asing Chinese invest­ments amidst the finan­cial crisis in 2011 and the debt crisis in 2014. The Portu­guese Ambassador to Berlin, Fran­cisco Ribeiro de Menezes, explains, Portugal has had a successful rela­ti­onship with China in terms of invest­ments in important sectors of our economy, namely during the finan­cial assis­tance programme.“ Slovenia, on the other hand, is part of 17+1“, an economic part­ner­ship between Eastern Euro­pean count­ries and China.

Still, the Slove­nian ambassador to Berlin, Franc But, sees dangers in China’s expan­ding influence. He warns that China might try to split the member states into two or more groups to weaken the Union’s posi­tion towards China. The Euro­pean Union has reached a dange­rous degree of power in the world,“ he says. To coun­ters­teer, the EU should over­come divi­sions and focus on strength in unity, Ambassador But believes.

Joshua Rosen­zweig argues there is evidence that this is all part of a Chinese stra­tegy, which he calls divide and conquer‘. The EU has a very clear idea that economic inte­rests and human rights should be intert­wined, but China has tried to pry the two issues apart and use that leverage not to be held accoun­table.“ Still, he remains opti­mi­stic: There is also evidence that the EU has been able to over­come China’s efforts and speak with one voice on some issues.“

The member states are doing it their way“

The EU’s new urge to find a common approach is also related to the member state’s reluc­tance to pick sides in the US-China trade conflict. The member states have decided not to stand behind either the US or China but to do it their way“, finding a unique balance between the two powers. The EU is adop­ting a stra­tegic approach, meaning that it must uphold and defend its own inte­rests and values. We use as a compass not the expec­ta­tions or pres­sures from outsi­ders, but what the EU wants and needs,“ says William Fingleton, the repre­sen­ta­tive of the EU in China.

In some areas, China is an even more valued partner than the US, who used to be Western Euro­pe’s most reliable ally. Dr. Silke Karcher, Head of Divi­sion for EU climate policy in Germany’s Ministry for Envi­ron­ment, says, China is defi­ni­tely more of a partner when it comes to climate than the US right now. When the US admi­nis­tra­tion announced its with­drawal from the Paris agree­ment, the Chinese came forward the next day and made it very clear that they would be true to the agree­ment, even though their biggest economic compe­titor would not be.“

The German govern­ment has taken on the ambi­tious task to unite the EU in a common approach towards China. But then came COVID-19, disrupting the nego­tia­tion of a new EU-China invest­ment treaty and making the key Leipzig summit between the leaders of state impos­sible. The ques­tion that remains is: Is Germany enough of a Euro­pean leader to make progress on the Euro­pean realignment even during a global pandemic?


Empfohlene Beiträge

Werde Teil unserer Community

Entdecke spannende Geschichten, vernetze dich mit anderen jungen Journalist:innen und gestalte die Medienlandschaft von morgen mit. Melde dich jetzt an und bleibe immer auf dem neuesten Stand.

Wehrpflicht Redaktion Gruppenbild